Philosophy of time: A slightly opinionated introduction by Fischer, Florian
Philosophy of time: A slightly
opinionated introduction
Florian Fischer
There are several intertwined debates in the area of contemporary philos-
ophy of time. One field of inquiry is the nature of time itself. Presentists
think that only the present moment exists whereas eternalists believe
that all of (space-)time exists on a par. The second main field of inquiry
is the question of how objects persist through time. The endurantist
claims that objects are three-dimensional wholes, which persist by being
wholly1 present, whereas the perdurantist thinks that objects are four-
dimensional and that their temporal parts are the bearers of properties.
The third debate in the field of contemporary philosophy of time is about
tense- versus tenseless theory. Tensers are at odds with detensers about
the status of the linguistic reference to the present moment. These are
only very crude characterizations and it is even disputed by some ad-
vocates of the corresponding positions that they are accurate. However
this very sketchy picture already reveals a fundamental difference: The
eternalism/presentism and endurance/perdurance discussions belong to
the field of metaphysics, whereas tense is in the first instance a linguistic
phenomenon.
Among the many fields of philosophy, there are two that are
more intimately interconnected than most but whose practi-
tioners have too long pursued relatively independent paths.
On the one hand, there are philosophers of language, who
have devoted much attention to indexicals (‘now’, etc.), tem-
poral operators (‘it has been the case that’, etc.), and tensed
sentences. On the other hand, there are the philosophers
of tensed and tenseless time (also called A-time or B-time,
dynamic time or static time, etc.). [27, p. 1]
Jokic and Smith’s claim can be generalized for philosophy of time
as a whole: There are prima facie distinct debates about the nature of
time, the persistence of objects and the reference to the present moment.
However these debates are interrelated and the position held regarding
one of them may have implications upon the options for the other debates.
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And even if systematic links between the debates have to be rejected, the
choices in one debate often de facto mirror the choices in the others: ‘the
line between philosophy of language and metaphysics is blurred and, one
is tempted to view them instead as a continuum’ [27, p. 3–4].
This introduction proceeds as follows: In section 1 the debate between
eternalists and presentists is depicted. Section 2 then introduces the
problem of change and the alleged solutions by the perdurantist and
endurantist. The positions of the tense and tenseless theoreticians are
presented in section 3. Lastly some inter-theoretical links and various
package-deals are presented in section 4.
1 Eternalism/Presentism
Eternalists and presentists debate about the nature of time.2 While
presentists think that the present is ontologically outstanding, eternalists
hold that the whole (space-)time3 is ontologically on a par or, put differ-
ently, ‘according to the presentist, only present entities exist; according
to the eternalist, past and future entities also exist’[63, p. 256]. Main
works of eternalists include David Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds
[32], Willard Van Orman Quine’s Word & Object [57] and Ted Sider’s
Four-Dimensionalism [59]. Seminal contributions to the debate by pre-
sentists include Bigelow’s Presentism and Properties [5], Ned Markosian’s
A Defence of Presentism [35], Trenton Merricks’ Persistence, Parts,
and Presentism [43] and Dean Zimmerman’s Temporary Intrinsics and
Presentism [67].
Eternalism and presentism come in different kinds of formulations.
They can be formulated concerning time itself or the occupants of time.
I will not discuss here whether these formulations are equivalent since
for our introductory purpose it suffices to sketch the big picture. In the
time-formulation, Ted Sider, an eternalist, characterises presentism as
‘the doctrine that only the present is real’ [60, p. 325]. Here he is talking
about time itself, so according to Sider’s presentist every non-present
time is not real. The future is not yet real and the past not anymore, one
might want to add. When formulated with the occupants in mind, the
debate is about ‘what there is’ or ‘about the range of things to which we’re
ontologically committed’ [11, p. 211]. Sider writes: ‘A presentist thinks
that everything is present; more generally, that, necessarily, it is always
true that everything is (then) present’ [60, p. 326]. Here the contrasting
class does not consist of the other times (future and past times), but of
the non-present objects. Dinosaurs do not belong to ‘everything’ since
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they are not present, according to Sider’s presentist.
Phrasing it in slightly more formal terms, the ‘everything’ suggests a
general quantifier ∀. Together with the mantra that ‘to be is to be the
value of a bound variable’ [56] [54] we can characterise presentism in the
way Ned Markosian did: ‘According to Presentism, if we were to make
an accurate list of all the things that exist – i. e. a list of all the things
that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over – there would be not a
single non-present object on the list’ [36].
As some have argued that the presentist cannot even articulate her
own view consistently4, formulations matter a great deal here. Note
that Sider speaks of ‘real’ while Markosian uses ‘exists’. Asked whether
Socrates exists, the presentist could give the (plausible) answer ‘No, he
existed ’. The presentist thus could acknowledge that Socrates is presently
not existing. However this denial does not imply that Socrates is on a par
with Santa according to the presentist. In contrast to Santa, Socrates, as
far as we know, existed. ‘Socates exists’ used to be true, while ‘Santa
exists’ was never true. The presentist thus neither has to bulldoze the
difference between Socrates and Angela Merkel nor the difference between
Socrates and Santa. In contrast to this, it sounds much more implausible
to say that Socrates is not real, just because he is not present. We leave
the matter be and turn to the presentist’s antagonist eternalism.
Eternalism states that ‘there are such things as merely past and
future5 entities’ [60, p. 326]. You may have noticed that this is the
occupants-formulation and that with ‘there is’ we have an existential
quantifier ∃. Sider’s formulation is quite careful. The ‘merely’ excludes
entities which are also present, entities with which the presentist (in
Sider’s fashion) would not have a problem. Furthermore, the existential
quantifier is very modest: One (merely) past entity suffices to make
‘there are such things as merely past and future entities’ true. Thus even
at the last moment of time, where there are no future entities, Sider’s
formulation could still differentiate presentism from eternalism.
Trenton Merricks supplies a time-formulation of eternalism: ‘Eter-
nalism says that all times are equally real.’ [42, p. 103]. The presentist
could actually agree in wording to this, if not in spirit, of course. For
the presentist the ‘all’ will range over the present only. It is thus trivially
true for her that all times are equally real, as there is only one time. The
idea behind the time-formulation of eternalism is clear however. There
are times other than the present and these are as real as the present. It is
not the case that the future and the past subsist, while only the present
exists. Even my earlier formulation that the eternalists believe ‘that all of
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(space-)time exists on a par’ is not enough to define eternalism, since all
of (space-)time could be unreal. Then it would be ‘on a par’ but not in
the way the eternalist wants. The formulation may suffice to distinguish
presentism from eternalism, however.
Merricks also offers a different characterisation of eternalism: ‘Objects
existing at past times and objects existing at future times are just as real
as objects existing at the present.’ [42, p. 103]. This is the occupants
formulation, obviously. Once again I would query that the presentist
must not deny the reality of (merely – which Merricks doesn’t mention)
past and future objects but maybe non-existing real entities seem strange.
Let’s fight squalidness with abundance and hear another characterisation
of eternalism, this time from David Lewis:
‘There is nothing so far away from us as not to be part of
our world. Anything at any distance at all is to be included.
Likewise the world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient
Romans, no long-gone peterodactyls, no long-gone primordial
clouds of plasma are too far in the past, nor are the dead
dark stars too far in the future to be part of this same world.’
[32, p. 1]
Lewis’, admittedly rhetorically brilliant, quote nicely captures the
egalitarian tendencies of the eternalist. All times are part of ‘this same
world’ and time is like space. The former we have heard before, while the
latter offers a new aspect of eternalism. Eternalists often overemphasize
that time is just one dimension of space-time and thus hold that time and
space are alike, or at least that ‘time is very much like the dimensions of
space’ [36]. They believe that ‘x is later then y’ is just another transitive,
irreflexive, asymmetrical relation, like ‘x is left of y’.
Eternalists ‘would like to stand in thought outside the whole temporal
process and describe the world from a point which has no temporal
perspective at all, but surveys all temporal positions at a single glance.
[. . . ] The different points of time have a relation of temporal precedence
between themselves, but no temporal relation to the viewpoint of the
description.’ [14, p. 369]. Dummett’s quote hints at the fear of the
eternalist that the presentist’s ontological prioritisation of the present
as the point of view of description deprives presentism of objectivity.
Perhaps this fear is justified, perhaps not.6
Of course we cannot end the (eternal?) battle of presentists and
eternalists in this meagre introduction. Let us listen to some allegedly
soothing tunes instead: ‘These two ways of thinking, the way of time and
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history and the way of eternity and of timelessness, are both part of man’s
effort to comprehend the world in which he lives. Neither is comprehended
in the other nor reducible to it.’ [49, p. 69]. This quote by Oppenheimer
can be used to challenge the very foundation of the eternalist/presentist
debate. Maybe they are not two mutually exclusive alternatives. Maybe
they could even be combined: ‘Hybrid views acknowledge that the world
may be thought of as an existent four-dimensional entity, [. . . ] but retain
the idea that there is something special about present times’ [10, p. 590]
– with this, Craig Callender hints at a possible combination of eternalsim
and presentism.
Another way to question the classical eternalism/presentism distinc-
tion is to say that it is not exhaustive. Presentists hold the present dear,
while eternalists believe all of (space-)time to be ontologically homoge-
neous. What of the people who want to distinguish between the past
and the future? You believe the past to be settled, while the future
holds a variety of possible developments? Maybe then the ‘growing block’
theory is something for you. According to its proponents ‘only objects
that are either past or present – but not objects that are future – exist.’
[36]. According to this theory, the past and present are on a par while
the future is differentiated from them. The present just happens to be
the ‘edge of existence’, i. e. the border of the block. And this block is
growing, because ‘the universe is always increasing in size, as more and
more things are added on to the front end (temporally speaking)’ [36].
This growing of the block is supposed to be the reason why the present
always differs in content.
We can distinguish the question whether the present is ontologically
special or not from the question whether what exists changes over time
or not. Following Cord Friebe’s [23, p. 43] terminology, we call a view
according to which existence is time relative ‘dynamic’ and one where
this is not the case ‘static’. Classic eternalism is static, as neither the
present is distinguished nor what there is changes over time. On the
other end of the spectrum we have classic presentism where the present
is so special that all there is, is present. One might think that presentism
is the only dynamic theory but the recently mentioned ‘growing block’ is
dynamic as well, at least according to Friebe [23, p. 44]. A static theory
besides classical eternalism is the so-called ‘moving spotlight’ theory.
According to the moving spotlight theory, the present is like a spotlight
(hence the name) which ‘sheds its light’ on the present point in time. It
moves (yes!) alongside the time line, thus always rendering a different time
present. You may be wondering now with which speed the present moves,
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or how it moves at all, if the ‘time line’ is supposed to be time. Well, of
course the spotlight-present moves in meta-time. If you find ‘meta-time’
suspicious and suspect that ‘movement in meta-time’ needs ‘meta-meta-
time’ to be explicated, then you are in the midst of McTaggart’s argument
[37]: ‘Tense realism is the tenet that tensed determinations, such as being
past, present, or future, are among the ingredients of temporal reality.
Famously, McTaggart maintained that the reality of time implies tense
realism, but argued that tense realism is incoherent’ [66, p. 281]. The
literature on McTaggart’s alleged [34] proof of the ‘unreality of time’ is
legion, and we can’t go into it here, but note that his contradiction charge
is alive and kicking.
These problems of a relatively moving present hint at why the presen-
tist cannot take the whole of (space-)time as ontologically prior and then
distinguish the present: this would lead right into the contradictory arms
of McTaggart! The presentist must think of the present as ontologically
prior and of the (space-)time as derivative (Cf. [22]). This does not imply
a denial of the reality of the non-present parts of (space-)time, like the
presentist must not deny the reality of dinosaurs. Be that as it may, we
now have to go on and turn to the question of persistence.
2 Endurance/Perdurance
The endurance/perdurance debate is about the persistence of objects
through (space-)time.7 It revolves around the so-called ‘problem of
identity through time’ [32, p. 202]: There is an imminent contradiction
with Leibniz’ Law for changing objects. To see this, we must first get a
grip on the concept ‘change’.
A theory of change is necessarily concerned with the persistence of
objects or systems through time and thus a criterion for change is that
something persists through the change. It is a different situation whether
a red ball is replaced with a blue one, or whether a red ball turns blue.
So, one benchmark for a theory of change is to distinguish change from
exchange.8 Call this ‘continuity’.9
A second benchmark for a theory of change is – which sounds almost
trivial – that there needs to be a change. I call this, neutrally, ‘difference’
as it may consist in a something else. For example, for Kant a persisting
substance changes by exchanging (‘Wechsel’) its properties, meaning that
the change of one entity can consist in the ceasing and beginning of other
entities [29, A187 B231]. However, there is more to ‘difference’: The
properties which are exchanged must also be incompatible in order for
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there be change. If something is first red and then square, it does not
amount to change.10
As we have sketched out, ‘change needs identity as well as differ-
ence’ [41, p. 89]. On the face of it, incompatible properties account
for the difference, while the continuity is ensured by the (numerical)
identity of the persisting object, but here the problem of persistence
has its systematic roots. According to Leibniz’ Law of indiscernibil-
ity of identicals11, things which are identical have the same properties:
∀x∀y[x = y → ∀F (Fx → Fy)]. This is in tension with the very idea
of change, according to which one and the same persisting object is
supposed to have different, even incompatible, properties.
2.1 The problem of persistence
During the rise of the new analytical metaphysics the question of the
nature of change was formulated anew by David Lewis. The possible
solutions to the problem of change he discusses are, till today, the base for
the accounts of persistence. These modern accounts fall into two camps,
which have their own ways of dealing with the imminent contradiction
with Leibniz’ Law.12
Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it
exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something
perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or
stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly
present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists
by being wholly present at more than one time [32, p. 202]
Figure 1: Endurantism Figure 2: Perdurantism
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Perdurantism: One possible solution is perdurantism, which de-
scribes objects as extended in time. Perduring objects do not only
have spatial extension, but also temporal extension. The things we
interact with in our everyday life are, according to perdurantism, three-
dimensional parts of actually four-dimensional objects. This is a dissolu-
tion of the contradiction, as the properties are instantiated by different
temporal parts. A ball which is first red and then blue thus changes by
having a red and a blue temporal part. The red temporal part is not
identical to the blue temporal part and hence the incompatible properties
can be instantiated without contradiction. This alleged solution of the
problem of change comes with the price that, contrary to our intuitions,
objects are four-dimensional space-time entities. ‘We perdure; we are
made up of temporal parts, and our temporary intrinsics are properties
of these parts, wherein they differ one from another. There is no problem
at all about how different things can differ in their intrinsic properties.’
[32, p. 204].
What constitutes continuity for the perdurantist? If there are just
different objects instantiating different properties, how can the perduran-
tist distinguish change from exchange? The obvious answer is that the
objects in question are temporal parts. Thus, there is a whole of which
they are part, so that the continuity is supplied by the parthood relation.
Ted Sider endorses a variant of perdurantism called the stage view,
‘which identifies continuants with the stages themselves’ [61, p. 84] and
not the four-dimensional whole. Here the three dimensional entities,
located at their respective moments of time, are called stages and not
temporal parts, precisely because they are not parts of a four-dimensional
whole. ‘Strictly speaking, the stages [. . . ] are only momentary entities but
they are nevertheless said to persist through time by having counterparts
at other times’ [4, p. 91]. In contrast to enduring objects the stages are
not multi-located. Identity cannot be the continuity-maker, since the
‘counterpart of something [. . . ] is never identical with the thing itself’ [30,
p. 45]. The stages do not persist themselves, as they are confided to their
respective temporal location but the stage view is nevertheless an account
of persistence, since the counterpart relation establishes continuity.13
One could launch a version of the famous Humphrey objection14
against ‘PerdurantismCounterpart’: If the ‘continuants of our everyday
ontology’ [61, p. 84] are stages and these only have the temporal properties
of their respective points in time, then it is hard to see how I can have
any non-present properties. Sider answers to this with a variant of Lewis’
reply to the original Humphrey objection: ‘I do have various tensed
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properties, such as the property of futurely being not straight. But this
is no more a lack of straightness than is being possibly not straight’ [61,
p. 85].
Notably, David Lewis, who holds a counterpart theory for cross-world
identification, does not posit a counterpart relation between the three-
dimensional one-time located perdurantistic property bearers. Without
arguments, however, it would be ad hominem to ignore it as a possible
unifier. Lewis states: ‘Perdurance, which I favour for the temporal
case, is closer to the counterpart theory which I favour for the modal
case.’ [32, p. 203] - and, sure, perdurance is closer than endurance, but
counterparts would be even closer. Lewis gives us a hint of why he rejects
counterpart-perdurantism: ‘counterpart theory concentrates on the parts
and ignores the [. . . ] individual composed of them.’ [32, p. 203]. Thus
it is questionable whether the inner-world-counterpart account in spirit
really is a perdurantistic solution or if it should better be pigeon-holed as
an endurantistic account. Let’s have a closer look at endurantism, then.
Endurantism: Endurantism respects the every day intuition that
objects are three-dimensional entities. Thus, enduring objects are multi-
located, as they are located at every time of their existence. The en-
durantist takes the, allegedly, more intuitive route of three-dimensional
objects, therefore the solution of the perdurantist is not possible for him.
Perdurantism can be understood as time-indexing the object. Parallel to
this the alleged solution of the endurantist can be depicted as temporally
indexing the predicates. Call this view indexicalism. Object o being F
at t1 is reinterpreted by the indexicalist as ‘o is Ft1’ or ‘Ft1(o)’. This
is not satisfactory, because an object which remains red would always
instantiate different properties (redt1, redt2, redt3, . . . ). In light of this
criticism adverbialism was invented. Here the copula ‘is’ is amended with
a temporal index, or a temporal adverb (hence the name adverbialism)
is added to the sentence. So either ‘The ball ist1 red’ or ‘The ball is t1-ly
red’. In the debate the name ‘adverbialism’ is used for both versions, but
sometimes the temporal-adverb-variant is taken to be the stronger one.
Without taking a stance on this, I will name the indexed-copula-variant
‘copularism’. It may turn out that metaphysically there is no difference
between the two or that copularism is a subspecies of adverbialism; still,
it helps to have the conceptual resources to distinguish them.
Lewis depicts endurantism differently: Contrary to the surface appear-
ance, intrinsic properties, like shapes are not really properties. They are
‘disguised relations’ [32, p. 204]. Object o stands, say, in the F-relation to
time t1 and in the G-relation to time t2. I call this variant ‘relationalism’
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and add it to our lists of solution candidates for the ‘problem of change’.
An additional alleged solution – in fact one that Lewis discusses in
[32, p. 203] – is presentism. Presentism is in so much a solution, as there
is ever only one moment of time (i. e. the present) and thus never are any
incompatible properties instantiated. As Presentism is not on a par with
the other options – it’s an account about the nature of time and not the
persistence through time – it is hard to depict it in the same fashion as
the other alleged solutions.15 One way to presentists represent change is
with temporal operators: when the object o is G ‘G(o)’ it was the case
that it was F: ‘PF(o)’16, because ‘[w]hile the eternalist can give the truth
conditions [. . . ] in terms of quantification over past objects [. . . ] the
presentist has to resort to irreducible tensed operators, which she does
not take to commit her to the existence of past objects’ [65, p. 2062].
According to Lewis, however, presentism ‘rejects endurance; because
it rejects persistence altogether’ [32, p. 203]. Lewis thinks that for a
presentist other times are on a par with fictions and that she thus does
not give an account of persistence. But, at least according to her own
claim, the presentist can distinguish between dinosaurs and unicorns.
Only the former have been present, while the latter – sadly – will never
have been present. True, ’[o]pponents of presentism have often argued
that the presentist has difficulty in accounting for what makes (presently)
true past-tensed propositions [. . . ] true in a way that is compatible with
her metaphysical view of time and reality’ [65, p. 2047]. So, I merely
want to note that Lewis’ argument is a non sequitur : From the presentists
denial that the present is on a par with other times, it just doesn’t follow
that other times are on a par with fictions.
A further possibility is to take the relation of property exemplification
(E) as dependent on time: Et1(o, f). This solution takes shapes to be
(index-free) properties and accepts the existence of points in time besides
the present – just like Lewis’ own solution. It is in no need, however, of
temporal parts. It goes back to a proposal by Uwe Meixner [39, p. 95].
Actually Meixner presents a slightly different version with a three-place
relation of property exemplification E3 which relates an object, a time
and a property: E3(o, t1, f). I call this proposals in honour of their – as
far as I know – inventor ‘MeixnerismEtn ’ and ‘MeixnerismE3 ’.
For both versions the relation can either be one of second order logic,
if its relatum is a property (like ‘F’ or ‘G’) or it can also be formalized
in first order logic taking the corresponding singular terminus (‘redness’
corrseponding to the property of ‘being red’ – so, ‘f’ or ‘g’). I take no sides
here. Maybe the choice is between logical simplicity and metaphysical
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dubiousness, maybe it doesn’t matter. Note that Meixner himself takes
‘f’ as a proper name for an universal.
Let us sum up:
Name Account Continuity
Perdurantism F(ot1) ∧ G(ot2) Parthood
PerdurantismCounterpart F(st1) ∧ G(st2) Counterpart
Indexicalism Ft1(o) ∧ Gt2(o) Multi location
Copularism O ist1 F and O ist2 G Multi location
Adverbialism O is t1-ly F and O is t2-ly G Multi location
Relationism F(o, t1) ∧ G(o, t2) Multi location
Presentism PF(o) ∧ G(o) Identity
MeixnerismEtn Et1(o, f) ∧ Et2(o, g) Identity
MeixnerismE3 E
3(o, t1, f) ∧ E3(o, t2, g) Identity
3 Tense/Tenseless
Now we turn to the controversy about the status of tense.17 This debate
started out within the philosophy of language. The old B-theoreticians
contested the relevance of the reference to the present moment. They
thought linguistic phenomena like tense and aspect and words like ‘now’
or ‘tomorrow’ belong only to the surface structure of sentences and ‘in
fashioning canonical notations it is usual to drop tense distinctions.’ [57,
p. 170]. The idea is that our messy language obstructs the access to
its own semantical or logical structure and deviation from the surface
structure helps to clear things up. Thus, the core of the old B-theory is
the ‘enterprise of paraphrasing statements so as to isolate their logical
structures’ [55, p. 44].
3.1 The old B-theory and the belief in unrestricted translatability
Eternalism denies an objective reference to the present moment and thus
tensed sentences must have tenseless truth conditions. According to the
eternalist the surface structure of a tensed sentence does not correspond
to an objective feature in the world. The simple correspondence theory
of truth states that a sentence like ‘Paris is the capital of France’ is
true just in case the corresponding state of affairs holds true, i. e. Paris
really is the capital of France. Likewise ‘It is raining now’ should be true
just in case it is raining now.18 An objective reference to the present
moment (now) leads to an objective truth value. As the eternalist drops
this objective reference to the present moment, she must come up with
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an ersatz truth-maker, otherwise he would have to deny that tensed
sentences have a truth value at all.
The old B-theoreticians19 believed in translatability : All tensed sen-
tences are translatable without a loss of meaning into tenseless sentences.
There were different accounts on the market of how this translation
should look like in detail. Gottlob Frege [21, p. 297] voted for a date
indication analysis : a tensed sentence like (S1) ‘It is raining now’ actually
means something along the lines of ‘it is raining at Thursday the 13th
May 2014’. Bertrand Russell’s token-reflexive analysis [58, p. 108] in
contrast states that the sentence should be translated into ‘It is raining
at the point in time that is co-temporal with this utterance’.
3.2 Prior and Perry on now
Arthur Prior has famously argued for the irreducibility of tense. Tensed
sentences and beliefs are not translatable into tenseless ones, according
to Prior. However, they are important for our actions. In [53] Prior’s
example is the joy we feel after an important test is over. Sentences we
utter at such occasion cannot be understood tenselessly and only tensed
beliefs explain our actions and change of emotions (i. e. from stressed to
relieved).
One says, e.g. “Thank goodness that’s over!”, and not only
is this, when said, quite clear without any date appended,
but it says something which it is impossible that any use of a
tenseless copula with a date should convey.’ [53, p. 17].
Prior was very explicit about the non-translatability of tensed sen-
tences and claimed that the attempt of the old B-theoreticians to substi-
tute indexicals like ‘now’ with a date and time indication failed. What
causes our joy after the important test is not that the test is over at,
say, 4 pm. We would have known that before hand. Also the tenseless
relation of earlier/later does not help in this case. It is tenslessly true
that 4.15 pm is later than 4 pm (on the same day). Neither the tenseless
fact that the test lasts till 4 pm, nor the tenseless fact that 4.15 pm is
later than 4 pm explains our joy and even both together are not sufficient.
It is the fact that it is 4.15 pm now that gives meaning to the sentence
‘Thank goodness that’s over!’ and that explains our feelings of joy and
our actions (celebrating). ‘Thank goodness that’s over!’ has an implicit
reference to the present moment and stands for ‘Thank goodness that’s
over now !’:
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It certainly doesn’t mean the same as, e. g. “Thank goodness
the date of the conclusion of that thing is Friday, June 15,
I954”, even if it be said then. (Nor, for that matter, does
it mean ‘Thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is
contemporaneous with this utterance”. Why should anyone
thank goodness for that?). [53, p. 17]
Neither the translation strategy of the old B-theory nor the token
reflexive strategy were able to capture the meaning of the tensed sentence
“Thank goodness that’s over!” according to Prior. Prior was chiefly
concerned with matters of time and thus his paper focused on the indexical
‘now’, which is also our topic here. John Perry made a more general claim
concerning indexicals. Perry’s 1979 paper [50] featured three examples of
which I would like to introduce the one starring the tardy professor :
[A] professor, who desires to attend the department meeting
on time, and believes correctly that it begins at noon, sits
motionless in his office at that time. Suddenly he begins to
move. What explains his action? A change in belief. He
believed all along that the department meeting starts at noon;
he came to believe, as he would have put it, that it starts
now. [50, p. 4]
Perry called beliefs which contain indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’
locating beliefs. Locating beliefs are necessary for actions, since the
corresponding tenseless beliefs do not explain the sudden movement of
the tardy professor. Perry’s conclusion was that we believe the same
thing, but in different ways:
As time passes, I go from the state corresponding to ‘The
meeting will begin’ to the one corresponding to ‘The meeting
is beginning’ and finally to ‘The meeting has begun’. All
along I believe of noon that it is when the meeting begins.
But I believe it in different ways. And to these different ways
of believing the same thing, different actions are appropriate:
preparation, movement, apology. [50, p. 19]
Since we are not concerned with beliefs here the details of Perry’s
account do not matter. We can, however, state that Perry puts forward
a strong argument against the translatability of tensed sentences into
tenseless ones. After Prior and Perry it has generally been accepted that
tensed sentences and beliefs are necessary for our actions and that they
cannot be translated without a loss of meaning into tenseless ones.
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3.3 The New Tenseless Theory of Time
The New Tenseless Theory of Time (NTT) differs from the old B-theories
by acknowledging the irreducibility of tensed sentences. So even B-
theories accept that there are sentences whose truth values depend on
time. The NTT thus incorporates more dynamics, as one would expect.
But still the NTT is an eternalistic theory, i. e. every point in time is
ontologically on a par and there is no objective reference to the present
moment. So, how does a non-tensed world view go alongside with
irreducible tensed sentences?
The NTT exploits the fact that the surface structure of a sentence
can deviate from the structure of the truth-maker of this sentence.20
According to the old B-theory, tensed sentences could, or even should,
be translated into tenseless ones, but after Prior and Perry this thesis
must be dropped. ‘[R]ecent defenders of the tenseless view have come to
embrace the thesis that tensed sentences cannot be translated by tenseless
ones without loss of meaning.’ [48, p. 58]. The new B-theoreticians
still call their view tenseless, but this tenselessness now concerns the
structure of the world.21 With the NTT the link between metaphysics
and language became much tighter. One can only truly be called a
B-theoretician nowadays if one holds a tenseless world view.22 ‘Tensed
discourse is indeed necessary for timely action, but tensed facts are not’
[48, p. 58].
Tensed beliefs can vary in their truth value but tenseless ones do not
change their truth value.23 Tenseless truth conditions can be given for
every tensed belief, according to the NTT.
Tensed sentences may have different truth values and thus must have
different truth conditions. This is at odds with the plausible claim that
any sentence, and thus also a tensed sentence, has the same meaning in
every context. The champion of the NTT, David Hugh Mellor himself,
agrees that ‘truth conditions must surely supervene on meanings’ [41,
p. 6]. A sentence like ‘it is raining now’ has the same meaning always
and everywhere. But it seems that according to the NTT the sentence
must change its truth conditions, since it must be made true by different
tenseless facts at every time. Only a tensed theoretician can maintain
that ‘it is raining now’ has the same tensed truth conditions in every
context, namely that it is true if the tensed fact that it is raining now
occurs.
At first glance it seemed that the B-theoretician could just posit a
different reduction strategy to acknowledge Prior’s and Perry’s arguments.
Instead of translating the tensed sentence she claims that there are
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different tenseless truth conditions for every token of the sentence. As
we have seen, however, this contradicts the claim that a sentence has
the same meaning at every time and that truth conditions supervene on
meaning.
Mellor’s NTT from Real Time II is supposed to solve this problem.
Mellor claims that a token of a tensed sentence is tenselessly true and
has only one truth condition. This acknowledges the variability of the
truth value on the type level. If a token of a tensed sentence is true,
then it is a-temporally true, made true by a tenseless fact. With this
distinction between type and token in place, Mellor can account for the
stable meaning of a tensed sentence. In his first attempt, Real Time [40],
Mellor understood the meaning of a tensed sentence as a function from
utterances to truth conditions. Due to strong critique [48] he changed
his position and in Real Time II [41] he understands the meaning of a
tensed sentence as a function from ‘B-times to B-truth conditions’ [41,
p. 59]. Meaning is concerned with sentence types, according to Mellor.
Tenseless sentences have constant functions as their meaning, while the
functions of tensed sentences can be non-constant. The possibility of
variation in the truth conditions (the co-domain of the function) allows
for the variability in the truth value.24
4 Packages
We have introduced the dynamic/static distinction in the context of
the presentism/eternalism debate (sec. 1). A quick reminder: a view is
‘dynamic’ iff existence is time relative, otherwise ‘static’. In section 3 we
have introduced the distinction between A- and B-theory.25 Combining
both leads to four time-reality combinations:
time reality
1. B-theory static
2. B-theory dynamic
3. A-theory static
4. A-theory dynamic
Classical eternalism is a static B-theory and classical presentism is
a dynamic A-theory. The moving spotlight theory states that existence
is not time relative, but the present is nevertheless ontologically distin-
guished and thus it’s a static A-theory, while the ‘growing block’ theory
is – at least allegedly – a dynamic B-theory.
Presentists are virtually always endurantists. Many may even think
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that presentism and perdurantism are inconsistent. At least Sider holds
that ‘no contemporary philosopher defends the combination of presentism
and perdurance.’ [59, p. 68]. Contrary to that, Berit Brogaard does
not only think that presentism and perdurantism are compatible, but
develops a Presentist Four-Dimensionalism in [7]. Jorgen Hansen builds
his Stage View Presentism on this which he claims to be ‘an appealing
alternative for presentists who remain impartial to both the endurantist
and the worm theories of persistence’ [26].
In the debate about persistence, eternalism is (often) presupposed.
This hints at a prima facie compatibility of both endurantism and per-
durantism with eternalism. This is plausible. Given eternalism the
disagreement is about what the world-line represents: perdurantist think
this is the whole object, whereas endurantists believe the world-line
to represent the history of the object. Figure 1 shows the object Oe
multilocated, while in figure 2 the object Op is the whole world-line and
at each point in space-time there is ‘only’ a part (like TP1, TP2, . . . ).
So, perdurantism seems to come pack and parcel with eternalism: ‘It
is certainly true that most if not all four-dimensionalists presuppose
eternalism.’ [59, p. 71]. The endurantist is, at least prima facie, free
to choose, however. The combination of eternalism and perdurantism
is called ‘manifold theory’ [59, p. 69]. The deal might be even more
inclusive for the perdurantist, as it may include the tenseless theory (see
section 3.3).
The other way around is quite inclusive as well: ‘Reductionists about
tense, then, are invariably eternalists.’ [59, p. 14]. So, If you are a de-
tenser, you almost have to be an eternalist. Most probably you are then
also a perdurantist, but this is not necessary: You may be a de-tensing,
eternalistic endurantist – for whatever reason.
Arthur Prior compiled the other ‘one-click-bundle’ available on the
market: He advocates the combination of tensed theory, endurantism
and presentism. Besides arguing for presentism [59, p. 18], Prior states:
‘it is not the case that one part of me was a boy in New Zealand while
another part of me is a man in England; it is I who was that boy, and
I - the same I - who am the man’ [51, p.183] - hence endurantism. He
further believes that ‘It is raining’ actually means ‘It is raining now’ [46,
p. 23].
There seems to be a tendency here: On the one hand, the perduran-
tism/tenseless theory/eternalism package fits well and is often bought in
one. Endurantism, tensed theory, and presentism, on the other hand, are
not so tightly interwoven. The mentioned packages offer only a glimpse
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at the various links between the debates. So, even if the three debates –
about the nature of time, the persistence through time, and the reference
to the present moment – start out independently, a satisfactory account
in the philosophy of time may very well need to take all three fields26
and their prerequisites into consideration.27
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Notes
1 Objects endure, if they persist by being wholly present. ‘Thus to say that Socrates
persists is just to say that the whole of him is present at each times of existence.’
[8, p. 883]. Numerically one object can be completely present at t1 and t2. When
it is present at t1, however, it can neither be present at t2 nor can a part of it be
present at t2. The worldline of an enduring object represents its history through
space and time (or space-time). This suffices as a rough characterization but it
is quite controversial how to capture ‘wholly present’ exactly. ‘[W]hat is it for
something to be “wholly present” at a time? It’s surprisingly difficult to say’ [12,
p. 318].
2 Kit Fine distinguishes between ontic and factive presentism: ‘Ontic presentism is
an ontological position; it is a view about what there is. Factive presentism, on the
other hand, is a metaphysical rather than an ontological position; it is view about
how things are, quite apart from what there is’ [16, p. 299]. Ontic presentism
can be associated with what I will call the occupants-formulation of presentism.
The, in my terminology, time-formulation does not correspond to Fine’s factive
presentism, however. The time-formulation and the occupants-formulation may
turn out to be equivalent, while Fine argues for a substantial difference between
factive and ontic presentism, as, for example, ‘[i]t is readily possible for a factive
presentist not to be an ontic presentist’ [16, p. 299]. Fine’s factive presentism is
compatible with ontic eternalism, as, as Giuliano Torrengo puts it, the ‘presentist
here is exploiting the metaphysical view of the A-theory of time to solve the
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contradiction, rather than her ontology restricted to presently existing entities’
[64, p. 255].
3 It is important to speak of space-time rather then only time, as it is sometimes
argued that modern physical theories, especially the SRT and ART, supply a
posteriori arguments for the philosophy of time. See the contribution of Cord
Friebe [22] in this volume, for an argument – completely contrary of what is
otherwise assumed – that only presentism can cope with the peculiarities of the
ART, namely the closed timelike curves of, so-called, Go¨del universes.
4 Presentism, it is argued, is either trivial or clearly false (Cf. [44, p. 214–216]).
The ‘exists’ in the presentist’s claim that ‘only what is present exists’, must be
understood either tensed or tenseless, according to the critics. It is trivially true
that only present entities exist now, while it is clearly false that only present
things exist simpliciter (just think about Socrates). Harold Noonan answers to
this charge: ‘Likewise, I suggest, it is neither trivially true nor obviously false that
everything (simpliciter) which is temporally locatable is presently existent.’ [47].
5 Perhaps it is even too much of a concession towards presentism to speak of ‘past’
and ‘future’ entities. ‘Future’ and ‘past’ only make sense in reference to the
present. Maybe the hardcore eternalist should say that all times/entities are
ontologically on a par. He should stick with the tenseless relations of ‘earlier’ and
‘later’ and completely shun talk of ‘present’, ‘future’ and ‘past’.
6 See [22] in this volume for a discussion of objectivity of presentism in the ART.
7 Also here talk of space-time instead of time might be important, as it is some-
times argued that perdurantism has an advantage over endurantism regarding
compatibility with the SRT (e. g. [2] and [3]). There Yuri Balashov argues that
the endurantist, and only she, is committed to claims containing tensed deter-
minations, which are allegedly incompatible with the SRT. See my [20] for the
attempt of a rebuttal of Balashov’s originally asymmetry thesis.
8 Arguably already Aristotle has distinguished change form exchange, as he clearly
distinguishes change from the processes of coming to be and passing away, accord-
ing to Thomas Buchheim [9, p. XVII]. Coming to be and passing away are not
just changes of some always existing entity
9 I have chosen the term ‘continuity’ in order to not pre-decide the debate. The
alleged unifier might be ‘identity’ or ‘parthood’ or ‘multilocation’ or something
else.
10 Change needs at least continuity and difference. See [19] for a longer introduction of
alleged characteristics of change. There I list: difference, identity, incompatibility,
irreversibility and succession.
11 ‘Identity looms large in Leibniz’s philosophy. He is responsible for articulating two
principles that, he claims, are constitutive of identity. The first, more controversial,
of these, called the identity of indiscernibles, says that qualitative indiscernibility
implies identity. The second, often referred to as Leibniz’s Law or the Indiscernibil-
ity of Identicals, says that identity implies qualitative indiscernibility. According
to Leibniz’s Law, if a is identical with b, every quality of a will be a quality of b.’
[24].
12 The contenders of the modern debate seem to be content with a removal of the
logical contradiction with Leibniz’ law. This, however, is not a solution of the
problem of change, but merely a precondition: Every theory which doesn’t address
the lurking contradiction is a non-starter. (As argued in [18].)
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13 Uwe Meixner [38] also presents a view – which he does not endorse – with a
temporal counterpart relation, called supereternalism. Meixner claims that with
it ‘one can have change, although no object whatever changes in the sense that it
ever has any other properties appropriate for change than those it has now.’ [38,
p. 432]. Both views seem quite similar to me.
14 For David Lewis your counterparts ‘are not really you. For each of them is in
his own world, and only you are here in the actual world. Indeed we might
say, speaking casually, that your counterparts are you in other worlds that they
and you are the same; but this sameness is no more a literal identity than the
sameness between you today and you tomorrow. It would be better to say that
your counterparts are men you would have been, had the world been otherwise’
[31, p. 114–115]. Kripke finds this absurd and has launched his, now famous,
Humphrey objection against it: ‘Thus, if we say ‘Humphrey might have won the
election (if only he had done such-and-such)’, we are not talking about something
that might have happened to Humphrey but to someone else, a ‘counterpart’.
Probably, however, Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter
how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world
[30, p. 45].
15 See the contribution of Jesse Mulder [45] in this volume, for an attempt of
‘Defining Original Presentism’. There Mulder agrees with Jonathan Tallard
[62], that eternalism and presentism need to be differentiated on a much more
fundamental level, then usually attempted.
16 See e. g. [25, p. 50] for an introduction to temporal logic. See [46] for a detailed
reconstruction and further development of Prior’s tense logic.
17 There are several related debates. Giuliano Torrengo offers the following, helpful,
classification: ‘The distinction between A-theory and B-theory is metaphysical.
According to the A-theory, the passage of time is real, and, thus, tense determi-
nations (such as being present, past, and future) are genuine features of reality.
According to the B-theory tense determinations are reducible to relations between
a perceiver and a position in time. The distinction between the presentist and
the eternalist is ontological. According to the presentist, in our most unrestricted
domain of quantification we find only presently existing entities, whereas according
to the eternalist also past and future entities exist. The distinction between the
serious tenser and the de-tenser is semantic. According to the serious tenser tensed
sentences express tensed propositions, namely propositions that are temporally
undetermined (their truth-value being possibly variable through time), whereas
according to the de-tenser tensed sentences express tenseless propositions, namely
propositions that are temporally determined (bearing a determined truth-value re-
gardless of time)’ [64, p. 253]. However, the terminology is far from homogeneous
in this area of philosophy. So, in this introduction I will switch freely between the
terms ‘tensed theory’, ‘tensers’, and ‘A-theory’ (as well as their counterparts) if
no a specific linguistic or ontological reading is necessary. Otherwise I make this
explicit.
18 [28] provides an overview of the semantics of the word ‘now’ in ordinary language
and discusses formal systems, drawing heavily on the work of Arthur Prior [52].
19 ‘Following McTaggart (1908), tensed and tenseless temporal judgments are often
called A-judgments and B-judgments, respectively. The concepts now, was, will,
and the like are called A-concepts, whereas the concepts before, after, and related
concepts are called B-concepts’ [59, p. 12].
22 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 3–28
20 We can have, for example, definite truth values for disjunctive sentences, without
positing disjunctive facts in the world.
21 Sonja Deppe [13], however, questions the claim of the tenseless theorists that
the relational structure of earlier/later is a metaphysical feature of time itself.
With the help of Henry Bergson – a philosopher who is, sadly and wrongly, under-
represented in the contemporary debate – she tries to show that this relational
structure is part of our intellectual engagement with temporal phenomena instead.
22 See my paper [17] in this volume. There I argue that the NTT may be too
metaphysical for some philosophers. Arguably Rudolf Carnap belongs in the
camp of the old B-theory, but cannot make the transition to the NTT, because
this contradicts his inter-translatability thesis and metaphysical neutrality thesis.
23 It is sometimes stated that tenseless sentences are always true if they are sometimes
true, but this is only one half of the story. There are two ways to negate the
variation in truth value. A sentence can either always have a truth value (omni-
temporal) or not in a timely sense at all (a-temporal). ‘5 is a prime number’ is an
example for an a-temporal truth [23, p. 60]. This sentence is a-temporal because
it is meaningless to ask ‘When is 5 a prime number?’. A-temporal sentences do not
vary in their truth value because conceptually they simply cannot. Omni-temporal
sentences could vary, because they are located in time but, for some reason or
other, just do not.
24 One possible critique is that this approach might not work if nature is too complex.
If time and space are continua, as for example Aristotle [1, ch. 5] has famously
argued, then there are at least uncountably many items in the domain of the
function. I don’t want to claim, however, that this attack is successful or promising,
I’m merely mentioning it.
25 See [45, p. 14] in this volume for a more ‘Fine’-grained characterisation, where
Jesse Mulder, following Kit Fine, distinguishes three versions of A-theory.
26 Of course, there might be even more debates which have to be taken into account,
as the epistemology of time or the history of philosophy. See the contribution of
Pamela Zinn [68] in this volume, which analyses Lucretius’ account of time in his
De rerum natura, focusing precisely not only on the nature of time but also on
its perception.
27 If you disagree with something, dear reader, then I’m satisfied. I would be glad if
you could prove me wrong and present your work on one of our SPoT-meetings:
http://s-p-o-t.weebly.com - please feel welcome to!
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